Myth

“Palestinian terrorist groups agreed to a cease-fire to advance the peace process envisioned by the road map for peace.”

Fact

In June 2003, Islamic Jihad and Hamas agreed to a hudna in response to demands from then Palestinian Authority prime minister Mahmoud Abbas to stop their attacks on Israel so he could fulfill his obligations under the Middle East road map. The agreement was interpreted in the Western media as the declaration of a cease-fire, which was hailed as a step forward in the peace process. Violence continued after the supposed cease-fire, however, and Israeli intelligence found evidence the Palestinians exploited the situation to reorganize their forces. They recruited suicide bombers, increased the rate of production of Qassam rockets, and sought to extend their range.

Now that he is president of the PA, Abbas is again negotiating with the terrorists to accept a cease-fire. While any cessation of violence against Israeli civilians is to be welcomed, it is important to understand the cease-fire the radical Islamic groups are contemplating in the Muslim context.

The media and some political leaders portray a hudna as a truce or a cease-fire designed to bring peace. Though the term hudna does refer to a temporary cession of hostilities, it has historically been used as a tactic aimed at allowing the party declaring the hudna to regroup while tricking an enemy into lowering its guard. When the hudna expires, the party that declared it is stronger and the enemy weaker. The term comes from the story of the Muslim conquest of Mecca. Instead of a rapid victory, Muhammad made a ten-year treaty with the Kuraysh tribe. In 628 AD, after only two years of the ten-year treaty, Muhammad and his forces concluded that the Kuraysh were too weak to resist. The Muslims broke the treaty and took over all of Mecca without opposition (Palestine Chronicle, July 6, 2003; Embassy of Israel [USA], June 27, 2003).

A modern-day hudna is not a form of compromise, rather it is a tactical tool to gain a military advantage. Hamas has used it no fewer than 10 times in 10 years (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2, 2003).

The hudna declared by Islamic terrorist organizations in 2003 was no different. The Hamas charter openly rejects the notion of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the group did not change its views. On the contrary, Hamas spokesmen said they would not give up their weapons, that they would continue to resist “illegal occupation,” and that they believed the “violent awakenening from a few weeks or months of quiet” will “reaffirm Palestinians' belief in the intifada as the only option for them” (Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2003; Haaretz, July 7 and 14, 2003; Israel Radio, July 10, 2003). Even the hudna declaration asserted “the legitimate right to resist the occupation as a strategic option until the end of the Zionist occupation of our homeland and until we achieve all our national rights.” Hamas contends that all of Israel is occupied territory. This is why Secretary of State Colin Powell called Hamas an “enemy of peace” just before the hudna was declared, and said “the entire international community must speak out strongly against the activities of Hamas” (The State Department, June 20, 2003).

Israel understandably fears a repeat of the earlier experience. The commander of the Aksa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus said, “we won't halt the resistance as long as the occupation continues” (Jerusalem Post, February 13, 2005). A spokesman for Hamas said after Abbas and Sharon declared an end to hostilities that the decision was “not binding on the resistance” (Haaretz, February 8, 2005). Meanwhile, Israel's military intelligence chief reported “there is quite a lot of organizing going on in the territories to prepare attacks, including big attacks,” and that the terror organizations were expanding their organizational infrastructure (Haaretz, February 16, 2005).

Whether the Palestinian terrorist groups are sincere in their declaration of a cease-fire is irrelevant to the fulfillment of the Palestinians' road map obligations. The road map explicitly calls on Abbas to do more than just achieve a cessation of hostilities; he is obligated to disarm the terrorists and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.