Bush's Milestone Speech: Opportunities and Responses

The Bush Plan

The speech delivered by President George W. Bush on June 24 was a milestone in Middle East peacemaking. Reversing his administration's initial vows to avoid micro-managing Palestinian-Israeli peace and to refrain from the "social engineering" of other peoples, the president's speech calls for steps requiring both: it commits Washington to be involved in all phases of implementing the proposed plan, whose cornerstone is a comprehensive reformation of the Palestinian Authority.

A careful reading of the text reveals that the Bush plan involves four principal phases:

Phase I: The removal of Yasser Arafat. While presented in the framework of broader required political reforms, the first phase of the plan calls for the emergence of "a new and different Palestinian leadership," one that is "not compromised by terror." The meaning is clear: Arafat manifests a culture of violence and terror, and any progress toward peace is contingent on his removal.

Phase II: The end of violence. In the president's words, "Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing terrorism. This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure."

Phase III: The establishment of a provisional Palestinian state: "The United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional." Building on the second phase, which mandates that violence subside and that there be "progress toward security," the third phase requires Israel to implement four measures to improve the environment of the provisional Palestinian state:

• To withdraw [IDF forces] fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000.
  
• "Consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop."
  
• "Freedom of movement [for Palestinians] should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life."
  
• Israel should release frozen Palestinian revenues into honest, accountable hands.

Phase IV:  A permanent status agreement. The final settlement in the Middle East will be negotiated, determining the borders of the Palestinian state and endowing it with those attributes of statehood and sovereignty not provided in the provisional (third) phase. The agreement codifying this settlement is intended to be reached within three years. Prior to that, "as we move toward a peaceful solution, Arab states will be expected to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel, leading to full normalization of relations between Israel and the entire Arab world."

In this phase Israel will be expected "to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state." Moreover, the magnitude of the concessions required of Israel at this phase of "resolving all claims and ending the conflict" is unmistakable: "Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated by the parties, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries."

A Sequential Process

A few observations about the president's long-awaited speech: First, contrary to the complaints of many, the address comprises a practical plan of action, based on a sequential process. It includes distinct phases, with each one enabling the successive phase. Indeed, the text is replete with "if-then" statements that make the sequencing and the conditional relations quite clear.

Second, the implementation of the plan is premised on the involvement of key Arab states, notably Jordan and Egypt. Their main tasks are to facilitate the end of violence by playing a major role in implementing agreed–upon security arrangements. Furthermore, they are enjoined to create an environment more conducive to the painful concessions that Israel will be required to make in the framework of the third and fourth phases of the plan.

Third, the Bush plan does not tolerate Arab states sitting on the sidelines. Instead, it requires them to choose between the Axis of Evil that includes Iraq and Iran, and the emerging coalition of Arab states supporting the end of terror and the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus, for example, "Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations."

Fourth, the Bush plan injects itself into the Israeli domestic debate in a complex manner. In the short term, it provides a de-facto endorsement of Sharon's approach -- making the end of violence a prerequisite to any resumption of negotiations and making any progress toward a negotiated peace contingent on Arafat's removal. But at the same time, the plan does not support Sharon's preference that the focus of any renewed negotiations be a long-term interim agreement. Instead, the Bush plan calls for the establishment of a provisional state as a corridor to a permanent status agreement and stipulates that the entire process should be completed within three years.

More important, on the grand-strategic level, the Bush plan rejects the goals of the Israeli right and endorses most national aspirations of the Palestinians, including the creation of an independent state and an "end to occupation." Significantly, it commits the U.S. to helping the Palestinians achieve these strategic objectives. As such, the Bush plan endorses the common understanding of the Israeli center and left -- namely, that the creation of a Palestinian state is necessary to preserve Israel's character as a democratic and Jewish state: "Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy."

Palestinian Reforms

Responding to internal and external pressures -- including those expressed in the Bush speech -- Arafat announced in late June and early July a set of political reforms. Within this framework, national elections are to be held in January 2003 and municipal elections are slated for March. Arafat reshuffled his cabinet and curtailed the number of ministerial positions. He also streamlined the security apparatus by nominating a Minister of Interior to be in charge of three important arms: the police, the Preventive Security Service, and the National Security Service.

Some key changes regarding specific individuals have been the removal of Jibril Rajoub as Director of the Preventive Security Service in the West Bank, and the nomination of Salam Fayyed as Minister of Finance. Fayyed is a widely respected economist, a former senior official of international financial institutions. His nomination elicited a positive response in Europe, accompanied by expectations that he will introduce greater transparency into the PA's financial practices, thus reducing opportunities for corruption.

Although these developments should not be dismissed as insignificant, most of the proposed changes run counter to the goals of internal and external advocates of the PA's reform. While most proponents of change envision reforms that weaken Arafat's hold on power, the PA leader tries to insure that reforms in fact tighten his reins.

Internally, instead of demonstrating sensitivity to the population in the West Bank and Gaza by advancing leaders who emerged from these territories rather than those groomed in Tunis, Arafat weakened "local" leaders by subordinating them to outsiders like the new Minister of Interior, Abdul Razak Yehia. In addition, Arafat made a mockery of the impetus to streamline the security apparatus by nominating Yehia as its czar. A mild mannered personality, Yehia is generally considered too weak to be able to assert effective control over these services. Moreover, his authority will be circumscribed by his limited power, as Force 17 and the Presidential Guard remain outside his jurisdiction.

Cracks in Palestinian Resilience?

Initial cracks in the Palestinian populations' staying power were evident in late June and early July. For the first time since the violence began in September 2000, a large-scale demonstration was held in Gaza to protest the PA's failure to guarantee that Palestinian breadwinners could provide their families with basic necessities.  Participants in the demonstration carried pita breads and empty plates to illustrate the point.

In a related development at the elite level, some 50 high-ranking Palestinian intellectuals published a statement calling for the end of suicide bombings directed against Israeli civilians residing inside the pre-1967 lines. While arguing that such bombings provide Israel's Sharon-led government with a pretext to reoccupy the West Bank, the statement provides another indication that a growing number of Palestinian leaders have concluded that the nearly two years of violence have resulted in a strategic catastrophe for the Palestinians.

The extensive personal authority enjoyed to date by PA leader Arafat is also showing initial signs of weakening. Thus, while he succeeded in removing Jibril Rajoub from his post, his plan to replace him with the Governor of Jenin, Zuhair Manasreh, failed when hundreds of officers of the Preventive Security Service insisted that Arafat nominate one from their ranks as Rajoub's successor. In addition, in recent weeks, some of the most important Palestinian leaders have distanced themselves from Arafat: Abu-Mazen left for an extended stay in the Persian Gulf, Muhammad Dahlen relocated to London, and Abu-Ala'a is due to leave for a lengthy medical treatment abroad.

Nevertheless, it seems far too early to write Arafat's obituary. Over nearly four decades Arafat has proven to be a master maneuverer, successfully resisting every effort to bring about his demise. While the current challenges to his authority -- accompanied by calls for his ouster or at least marginalization -- seem unprecedented in their magnitude, the possibility that he would once again overcome opposition cannot be excluded.

Developments in Israeli Policy

Since operation "Defensive Shield," there have been three important developments in Israeli policy. The first is a follow-up military operation, "Determined Path," launched in June in response to continuous Palestinian terror attacks against Israeli civilians. The success of the terrorist cells in the West Bank in regrouping much faster than expected following "Defensive Shield" in April, and the resumption of suicide bombings and other attacks in Israel, propelled the new military operation. It comprises the de-facto reoccupation of all the Palestinian population centers in the West Bank, excluding only Jericho. Thus, some Palestinian cities that were hardly affected by "Defensive Shield" -- most notably Hebron -- are now included in the IDF's operational plan. At the same time, Gaza, which was excluded from the April operation, has also largely been spared so far under "Determined Path."

Second, in contrast to "Defensive Shield," operation "Determined Path" seems less subject to external pressures to limit its timeframe. In part, this may be explained by the increased international sympathy for Israel's need to defend itself from Palestinian terrorist attacks, and the growing disillusionment, not only in Europe but also in some of the Arab capitals, with regard to Arafat's willingness or ability (or both) to reverse course.

Third, the aforementioned cracks in the Palestinians' resilience are also manifested in the lack of serious local resistance to the IDF's efforts. Thus, "Determined Path" has been associated with very little fighting.

From the vantage point of Israel's war on terror, the relative success of operation "Determined Path" is already evident. As of this writing, Israel has been free of a major terror attack for nearly three weeks, and hence the demonstration that offensive operations compel the terrorists to devote most of their energies to self-preservation.

At the same time, the IDF's de-facto reoccupation of Palestinian population centers entails new dangers for Israel. Primary among these is the risk that the hardships experienced by the Palestinian population would cross all thresholds, including the possible development of "islands" of famine. Given the near collapse of the PA and its ability to provide the population with basic social services, this may compel Israel, in a complete reversal of the Oslo process, to reassume responsibility for meeting the Palestinians' basic necessities, at least in the West Bank.

The second development in Israeli policy involves the government's decision to begin erecting a fence around the West Bank as well as Jerusalem at-large. The aim of the fence is limited: to make infiltration into Israel by suicide bombers, and particularly by car bombs, more difficult. Thus, it should be seen as adding another layer, this one clearly defensive, to the other measures employed by Israel in its efforts to confront the terrorist threat. Indeed, even in this context the effects of the Israeli government's decision can only be partial; it is expected that constructing the first 100 kilometers of the fence would take some ten months, and that at best this would cover a third of the length needed to make it as effective as the fence currently surrounding the Gaza Strip.

Thus, the operational decision to build the fence should not be confused with a strategic decision to disengage from the Palestinians -- a decision that has not been taken and is unlikely to be taken by Israel's present government. As already mentioned, the depth of Israel's involvement with the local population is in fact increasing in the framework of operation "Determined Path." Moreover, as long as Israel continues to maintain almost two hundred settlements in the West Bank, some of them in close proximity to Palestinian population centers, such separation cannot be achieved. Defending these settlements and the routes leading to them requires the IDF's ongoing deployment deep inside the West Bank. This effectively preempts a reduction of the friction between Israelis and Palestinians.

The final development in Israeli policy experienced during the past few weeks concerns the statement made by Prime Minster Sharon in early July, to the effect that a process has been launched in various Israeli government quarters to define a "political horizon" for Israel's relations with the Palestinians. While no details were released to indicate what such a horizon might look like, Sharon's statement may be seen as an initial sign of appreciation that Israel's tactical successes in reducing the magnitude of Palestinian violence and in the marginalization of Arafat might force its government to define how it proposes to proceed. Under such circumstances, the external pressures currently focused on the PA might be redirected at Israel. In other words, if the operational objectives of the first two phases of the Bush plan are met, Israel will be expected to demonstrate how it plans to advance the goals associated with phases III and IV of the plan or to propose viable alternatives.

Professor Shai Feldman
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
Tel Aviv, July 10, 2002