Defensive Shield: A Post Mortem

The Operation, Its Goals and Results

Though sporadic terror attacks inside Israel by the Palestinians, such as Wednesday's near Megiddo, continue, by and large operation Defensive Shield, the large-scale Israeli military operation launched against the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in May, can be considered a success.

After two months of intensive suicide bomber attacks inside Israel culminating in the attack on the Park Hotel in Netanya on Passover eve, killing 30 people including entire families, the government authorized the IDF to enter Palestinian controlled areas (Area A) with full force.

Over 30,000 reservists were called into duty for the operation that included incursions into most of the major Palestinian cities on the West Bank.

The goal of the operation was fourfold: to destroy as much of the terrorist infrastructure as possible; to re-establish Israeli deterrence; to place the terrorist organizations on the defensive, and to isolate Arafat and weaken his authority.

The scope of the operation, and the decision to enter Arafat's personal headquarters in Ramallah, the Mukata, took the Palestinians by surprise. It had commonly been assumed that the IDF would be deterred from entering Palestinian-controlled cities and refugee camps because of the potentially high cost in human terms of fighting in a dense urban environment.

It was also assumed that a large-scale Israeli entry into Palestinian controlled territories would arouse international criticism of Israel and increase the chances of Arafat achieving his goal of internationalizing the conflict.

Thirty Israeli soldiers were killed in the operation, 23 of them in Jenin (13 in a single ambush) where Fatah –Tanzeem put up fierce resistance. Other than Jenin, opposition was minimal, with hundreds of terrorist suspects being rounded up. Some 200 Palestinians were reported killed in the operation, including several key terrorists long on Israel's wanted list.

The relative ease with which the IDF entered even the most complicated Palestinian areas restored the element of Israeli deterrence that had been clearly eroded in recent months given the ever-increasing number of attacks against Israeli civilians.
It is now clear that the IDF can react and pre-empt efficiently in areas previously assumed to be beyond its reach. The military units involved displayed a high degree of professionalism, sustaining and causing minimal casualties and the intelligence supplied by the security services seems to have been sound.

Although it was understood from the outset that Defensive Shield would not cause a permanent or total stop in terror, the expectation that it would dramatically cut down on the number of attacks has been well borne out. In terms of terrorist infrastructure destroyed, the damage to the operational capabilities of the various terror organizations was considerable. Bomb-making factories, arms caches and other infrastructure were either captured or destroyed.

Key operational commanders, particularly those associated with dispatching suicide bombers into Israel were either killed or captured. Valuable intelligence from other sources was also gathered; including documents the Israeli government claims link Arafat directly to terror. The amount of intelligence gathered from those taken prisoner has also been considerable, as witnessed by the IDF's on-going, pinpoint raids into Palestinian controlled areas on a daily basis. According to the head of the GSS, Israel's internal security organization, nine suicide attacks were pre-empted last week, including the arrest of two 16-year-old girls about to embark on a joint attack.

No operations were conducted in or against targets in Gaza as part of Defensive Shield. However, in late May after a suicide bomber believed to have come from Gaza exploded himself in Rishon Le-Ziyon killing 13 people, the army was poised for a full-scale attack against the terrorist infrastructure in Gaza.

Despite pressure from the military that wanted to clear up Gaza now that the West Bank had been effectively dealt with, the government decided to hold off attacking Gaza as it was felt that it would be difficult to justify internally. This because none of the suicide attacks against targets in Israel since the current conflict started in September 2000 have emanated from Gaza. The international public relations impact of Israeli tanks going through refugee camps again was also expected to be extremely negative.

Also, despite the IDF's successes in the cities and refugee camps on the West Bank, it was assessed that Gaza's topography, the density of the population and nature of refugee camps would make such an operation costly.

While Defensive Shield can be considered an operational success it has posed new challenges for the terrorist organizations determined to continue the conflict.

In late May a potentially extremely damaging attack was averted by chance. A bomb attached to the rear of the driver's cabin of a tanker truck carrying diesel fuel was detonated as the tanker entered Pi Glilot, Israel's largest gas and fuel distribution point situated between Tel Aviv and Herzlia. If the tanker had not been transporting diesel fuel, but petrol or gas and had been closer to the gas storage tanks, all of which are above ground, the results could have been dire.

Unlike in the past, no Palestinian organization has taken credit for the attack but the question arises as to whether the attack against Pi Glilot marks an attempt at mega-terrorism. Given the sharp drop in the effectiveness of suicide bombings due to Israel's pre-emptive policy and defense measures like guards at restaurants and shops, it could be that those in the Palestinian camp opposed to reconciliation with Israel are looking to seriously escalate the conflict.

Political Ramifications
The Diplomatic Fallout

The nature of the fighting in densely populated urban areas and unbalanced reporting of Defensive Shield caused some damage to Israel's foreign relations, particularly with Europe.

The exaggerated reporting of European correspondents, particularly regarding the battle in Jenin, coupled with the pictures of physical damage caused by Israeli armor, propelled some organizations and individuals in Scandinavian countries in particular to boycott Israeli goods.

The Israel Citrus Grower's Association announced June 3, that the export of oranges to Europe had dropped by 25 per cent. In Norway the 880,000-strong labor union called for a boycott of Israeli goods. Germany halted the supply of engines for the Merkava tank and in France 56 synagogues and Jewish institutions were attacked in a month.

Due to the inaccurate reporting of UN envoy Terje Larsen of the Jenin situation the U.N. hurriedly decided to appoint a commission of inquiry into Israel's actions in the city. At the time Israel was accused of having killed hundreds of Palestinians there. The real toll was 54 -- many of them armed militants.

While Israel had nothing to hide, legal experts noted that the UN commission was a potential Trojan horse for charging Israeli officers with war crimes, even if no specific wrongdoing was recorded. Israel was also opposed to the commission's composition.

The commission was abandoned when it became clear that there was no massacre in Jenin and as part of a deal proposed by the Saudis and brokered by the Americans that lifted Israel's 31-day siege of Arafat and his Ramallah headquarters.

Criticism now seems to be abating, with even some contrition being displayed by the European media in that they were too quick off the mark in reporting "genocide" and Israeli war crimes, as well as desecration of one of Christianity's holiest sites, the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem.

Israel's protracted siege of the church compound in Bethlehem initially caused serious friction between Israel, the Vatican and the Christian community. When it later became clear, however, that the terrorists inside were actually holding the clergy there hostage, opinion changed quickly with the Christian leadership placing heavy pressure on Arafat to negotiate a deal.

In another aspect of the operation a precedent was set when, as part of the deal that ended Arafat's isolation, Israel agreed to wanted terrorists with Arafat in the Mukata at the time, being handed over to American and British jailers to oversee their incarceration in a Jericho jail. Israel also agreed to 13 terrorists being transferred to six European countries to end to siege of the church of Nativity. Both decisions signal that Israel is now prepared for international involvement in situations where bi-lateral solutions do not work, a change in Israeli policy until now where international intervention has been rigorously avoided.

In the U.S. all polling data consistently shows strong public support for Israel, this being reflected on both the Hill and within the Administration.

The Isolation of Arafat

The Israeli incursion into the Mukata, Arafat's personal compound, took the Palestinians completely by surprise. They had assumed that Israel would be dissuaded by international opinion from doing so.

Sharon ordered the incursion into the Mukata to press the point that he does not consider Arafat a negotiating partner and will not deal with the Palestinian leader. It was also designed to isolate the Palestinian leader, cut him off from the branches of the PA and make him irrelevant.

Sharon at the time was personally inclined and under heavy internal political pressure from his right-wing coalition partners to expel Arafat. He stopped short of the move when the Americans and Egyptians warned that such a move would be counter-productive.

While President Bush has called Arafat "a failed leader", the Americans, at this stage still consider Arafat the symbol of the Palestinian people and have no intention of replacing him.

Initially Sharon's attempt to isolate Arafat failed. Television crews and peace activists managed to penetrate the compound sending pictures of Arafat and his aides around the world placing Arafat on center stage. In the longer term, however, the move has resulted in increasing erosion of Arafat's popularity and intensified international and internal demands for reform in the PA.

Palestinian Reforms

One of the important and almost unexpected results of Defensive Shield has been an almost universal demand for fundamental reform within the Palestinian Authority. Sharon has demanded reform as a condition for future negotiations. More importantly, however, is the significant pressure from the U.S., the Europeans, the Arab world and from within Palestinian society on Arafat to reform the PA.

In a mid-May survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy Research 91 per cent of Palestinians respondents said they wanted fundamental changes in the PA. Ninety five per cent said they wanted the current cabinet dismissed and 85 per cent want to see the security services, which have often overstepped their authority, restructured. Over 80 per cent believe that the PA's institutions are corrupt. What is being demanded is transparency of government, official accountability, general public freedoms and an independent legislature.

There is much skepticism as to how much authority Arafat will actually relinquish and how much reform he will allow. He remains firmly in command and the chance for any real reform while this is the case is slim indeed. Some constraints on his hitherto limitless power, however, may be set in place.

The initial areas of reform planned in the short-term are the re-organization of the security forces, down from 17 individual structures to four, under one unified commander and accountable to a national security council; the reduction in the size of the Palestinian cabinet from 30 to 18 ministries, and a change in leadership and structure of the Palestinian finance ministry.

The US, through CIA director George Tenet, will facilitate the security reforms. The Europeans are expected to play a central role in the inculcation of the democratic process and the ratification of the Basic Law passed by the PLC in 1997, which is essentially the Palestinian Constitution.

Heading the reform movement are well-known pro-democracy figures like Hanan Ashrawi and PLC member Ziad Abu Amr as well as the "Young Guard" – Palestinian leaders who lived in the territories before Oslo and consider many of those around Arafat who came back with him from exile corrupt.

The Negotiating Process

One of the results of Operation Defensive Shield was that it generated a fear among regional leaders that the conflict could expand if the terror did not stop. Fears of regional escalation and Islamic fundamentalism in their own countries being fueled by the pictures being relentlessly beamed by Arab satellite stations of Israeli actions in Jenin, coupled with seditious reporting, have led Arab leaders to pressure Washington to end its relative passivity in dealing with the conflict.

The Saudis, with their peace plan adopted by the Arab League in Beirut and constant pressure on the Bush administration, visits to the U.S. by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Abdallah and other moderate Arab leaders, have had an apparent effect with signs that the U.S. is indeed deepening its involvement.

At the same time these leaders have increased their direct pressure on the Palestinians. In an unprecedented move the Saudis cut off funding for the PA and Hammas, making it clear that the terror must stop. The Egyptian government, for its part, sent Omar Suliman, head of the General Intelligence Services over to see Arafat twice with the blunt message that the terror has to stop.

Prime Minister Sharon will be visiting Washington early June, shortly before the Administration unveils its policy toward resolving the conflict. The effort will probably center on three issues: achieving a serious and lasting cease fire, holding a regional conference in late July or August, and ensuring that real reform does take place in the PA.

The success of a regional conference will first and foremost be predicated on whether terror can indeed be contained and on whether Sharon, given his right-wing opposition, can adopt positions that will facilitate the beginnings of a serious negotiating process.

Hirsh Goodman
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
Tel Aviv University, June 5, 2002

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